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Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) can significantly improve the security of crypto-
graphic protocols, by ensuring that generated keys cannot be predicted. However, the cost, size,
and power requirements of current QRNGs has prevented them from becoming widespread. In the
meantime, the quality of the cameras integrated in mobile telephones has improved significantly, so
that now they are sensitive to light at the few-photon level. We demonstrate how these can be used
to generate random numbers of a quantum origin.
INTRODUCTION
The security of cryptographic protocols, both classi-
cal and quantum, relies on the generation of high qual-
ity random numbers. For example, classical asymmetric
key protocols such as DSA [1], RSA [2, 3] and Diffie-
Hellman [4], use random numbers, tested for primality,
to generate their keys. Another example is the uncon-
ditionally secure one-time pad protocol, which needs a
string of perfectly random numbers of a length equal to
that of the data to be encrypted. The main limitation of
this protocol is the requirement for key exchange. Quan-
tum key distribution offer a way to generate two secure
keys at distant locations, but its implementation also re-
quires a vast quantity of random numbers [5].
Famously, Kerckhoffs’s principle [6] states that the se-
curity of a cypher must reside entirely in the key. It is
therefore of particular importance that the key is secure,
which in practice requires it to be chosen at random. In
the past, weaknesses in random number generation [7]
have resulted in the breaking of a number of systems and
protocols, such as operating system security [8], commu-
nication protocols [9], digital rights management [10] and
financial systems [11].
High quality random numbers are hard to produce, in
particular they cannot be generated by a deterministic
algorithm such as a computer program. To ensure the
randomness, and importantly, the uniqueness of the gen-
erated bit string, a physical random number generator
is required [12, 13]. Of particular interest are quantum
random number generators (QRNGs)[14], which by their
nature produce a string which cannot be predicted, even
if an attacker has complete information on the device.
QRNGs have typically been based on specialised hard-
ware, such as single photon sources and detectors [15–17]
or homodyne detection [18, 19]. Image sensors have been
used to generate random numbers of classical origin by
extracting information from a moving scene, e.g. a lava
lamp, or using sensor readout noise [20] but their per-
formance both in terms of randomness and throughput
has been low. Here we show how random numbers of a
quantum origin can be extracted from an illuminated im-
age sensor. Nowadays, cameras are integrated in many
common devices such as cell phones, tablets and laptops.
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FIG. 1. A detector, or indeed each pixel of an image sensor,
can be modelled as having 100% efficiency, but being pre-
ceded by a lossy element (beamsplitter) with transmission η.
For each absorbed photon, the detector generates an electron.
This charge is then converted into a voltage and amplified,
before being digitised and sent to further processing, i.e. a
randomness extraction stage.
In the first part of this paper we describe the concept
of our system, including its various entropy sources and
how the entropy of quantum origin can be extracted. In
the second part, we characterise two different cameras
for random number generation. Finally we present our
results and test the generated random numbers.
CONCEPT
Most light sources emit photons at random times.
Thus, it is impossible to perfectly define the number of
photons emitted per unit time. This quantum effect is
usually called “quantum noise” or “shot noise” and has
been shown to be a property of the light field rather than
the detector [21]. Only some particular light sources,
namely amplitude-squeezed light [22], can overcome this
fundamental noise. Beside these very specific sources, the
number of photons emitted per unit of time is governed
by a Poisson distribution. For a mean number of pho-
tons n¯, we obtain a standard deviation of
√
n¯. We can
exploit this quantum effect to realise a QRNG by using
a detector capable of resolving this distribution.
As shown in FIG. 1, a detector can be modelled as
lossy channel with a transmission probability η follow
by a photon-to-electron converter with unit efficiency.
In this model, η contains all the losses due to the op-
tical elements and the detector’s quantum efficiency. An
analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) encodes the electron
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2numbers into digital values. We can define an electron-
to-digital conversion factor ζ. If ζ ≥ 1 for each possible
number of electrons there is at last one unique corre-
sponding digital code. Under these conditions we access
the shot noise statistics of the light and can use this to
generate quantum random numbers. To complete the
model of the detector, noise needs to be added. This
noise has different origins e.g. thermal noise, leakage
current or readout noise. Generally, this noise follows a
normal distribution and adds linearly to the signal, as
show in FIG. 2.
(b)
(a)
(c)
Technical
noise
Quantum
noise+Eve Alice
FIG. 2. Working principle and assumptions: (a) we measure
a number n of photoelectrons on a image sensor’s pixel with
a probability P (n). Assuming that the detector is operat-
ing in a linear regime, this measured distribution will be the
combination of quantum uncertainty (b) and technical noise
(c). From a single shot measurement we cannot distinguish
these two noise components, however we assume that to our
adversary the technical noise is fully deterministic.
At the output of the detector, we obtain a random vari-
able X = Xq + Xt, where Xt and Xq are independent
random variables taken from the technical noise distri-
bution Dt and the quantum uncertainty distribution Dq,
respectively. We assume that the technical noise is com-
pletely known to an adversary (Eve). We can thus rely
only on the quantum entropy generated.
The amount of quantum entropy will correspond to the
entropy of a Poisson distribution with a mean equal to the
average number of photons absorbed n¯, which expressed
in bits is:
H(Xq) =
n¯
ln(2)
[1− ln(n¯)] + e
−n¯
ln(2)
∞∑
m=0
n¯m ln(m!)
m!
(1)
for large values of n¯ this expression can be approximated
to:
H(Xq) ≈ ln(2pien¯)
2 ln 2
. (2)
To collect this entropy entirely, the detector must have
ζ ≥ 1. The measured value X is encoded over b bits.
The entropy H(Xq) of quantum origin per bit of output
will be on average H(Xq)/b < 1. To obtain a string of
perfectly random bits, i.e. with unit quantum entropy
per bit, an extractor is required.
As detailed in Ref. [23], an extractor computes a num-
ber k of high-entropy output bits yj from a number l > k
of lower-entropy input bits ri. This can be done by per-
forming a vector-matrix multiplication between the vec-
tor formed by the raw bit values ri and a random l × k
matrix M (performed modulo 2):
yj =
l∑
i=1
Mjiri. (3)
Note that although the element of M are randomly dis-
tributed, M is a pre-generated constant. For raw input
bits with entropy s per bit, the probability that the out-
put vector yj deviates from a perfectly random bit string
is bounded by:
 = 2−(s l−k)/2. (4)
EXPERIMENT
Detectors able to resolve shot noise have traditionally
been complicated and bulky, e.g. homodyne detectors.
In recent years, however, image sensors such as the ones
found in digital cameras and smartphones have improved
immensely. Their readout noise is of the order of a few
electrons and their quantum efficiencies can achieve 80%.
Besides their ability to resolve quantum noise with high
accuracy, image sensors are intrinsically parallel and of-
fer high data rates. Here we generate quantum random
numbers both with a commercial astronomy monochrome
CCD camera (ATIK 383L), and a CMOS sensor in a mo-
bile phone (Nokia N9), a colour camera, from which we
use only the green pixels for the purpose of this article.
The experimental setup for the random number gen-
erator is shown in Fig. 3: a camera is illuminated by a
LED, the raw pixel data is passed through an extractor
the output of which are random numbers ready to be
used.
First however, we check that the cameras comply with
the manufacturer’s specification and that the operating
conditions are appropriate for the generation of quan-
tum random numbers. In particular, we are interested in
verifying that the photon number distribution does not
exceed the region where the camera is linear, and that
there are enough digital codes to represent each possible
number of absorbed photons, i.e. ζ ≥ 1.
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FIG. 3. Random number generator setup: a camera is fully
and homogeneously illuminated by a LED. The raw binary
representation of pixel values are concatenated and passed
through a randomness extractor. This extractor outputs
quantum random numbers.
Characterization
To characterise the two cameras, we use a well con-
trolled light source based on a light emitting diode
(LED), as shown in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 1, a number of photons n is absorbed
by the image sensor and converted into an equal number
of electrons. This charge is in turn converted into a volt-
age by an amplifier, and finally digitised. The amplifier
gain (which in the sensors used corresponds to “ISO”
setting) is set such that each additional input electron
will result in an output voltage increase sufficient to be
resolved by the ADC. This means that each electron in-
crease the digital output code c by at least 1. We check
that this is the case by illuminating the cameras with a
known amount of light. Using the nominal quantum effi-
ciency of the cameras we can infer n¯, and observe ζ = c/e
to be 2.3 codes/electron for the ATIK camera, and 1.9
codes/electron for the Nokia camera, as expected from
the devices’ specifications.
To evaluate the linearity of the camera sensors, we
measure the Fano factor given by F = Var(c)ζc . In Fig. 4 we
plot the F for various illuminating intensities of our light
sensors. Both detectors have a large range of intensities
where the Fano factor is constante with a value close to 1.
In this range the statistics are dominated by the quantum
uncertainty (shot noise). At strong illuminations, satu-
ration occurs, for the Nokia N9 this happens at inten-
sities corresponding to 450 absorbed photons per pixel.
This is due to the high amplifier gain used (ISO 3200).
When saturation occurs, the Fano factor decreases, as
the output is a constant. At low illumination intensities,
we measure a Fano factor much greater than 1, due to
detector technical noise.
Image sensors such as CCD and CMOS have various
sources of noise: thermal noise, leakage current and read-
out noise. Thermal and leakage noise accumulate with
integration time, so that it is possible to eliminate them
using short exposure times (of the order of a millisec-
ond). In this case, readout noise becomes the dominant
technical noise, and is given by the readout circuit, the
amplifier and the analog to digital converter (ADC). In
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FIG. 4. Fano factor (Variance/mean) of the devices emptied
in this experiment. We operate in the region where the Fano
factor is 1 and the detector is most linear.
ATIK 383L Nokia N9
Noise, σt (e
−) 10 3.3
Saturation (e−) 2 × 104 500
Illumination (e−) 1.5× 104 410
Quantum uncertainty, σq (e
−) 122 20
Offset (e−) 144 −6
Output bits per pixel 16 10
Quantum entropy per pixel 8.9 bits 6.4 bits
Quantum entropy per raw bit 0.56 0.64
TABLE I. Experimental parameters for the two cameras em-
ployed in this experiment.
image sensors, noise is usually counted in electrons (e−).
The CCD camera and CMOS camera have a noise of
10 e− and 3.3 e− respectively.
Random number generation
To generate random numbers we illuminate the cam-
eras so that the mean number of absorbed photons n¯
is sufficient to give a quantum uncertainty σq =
√
n¯ as
large as possible whilst not saturating the detectors. In
practice we illuminate the ATIK and Nokia cameras with
an amount of light sufficient to generate 1.5× 104 e− and
410 e− respectively.
Using equation 1, it is possible to calculate that the
amount of entropy of quantum origin per pixel is 8.9 bits
and 6.4 bits for each camera respectively, which are en-
coded over 16 and 10 bits, resulting in an average entropy
per output bit of 0.56 for the CCD and 0.64 for the CMOS
sensor. Working parameters and results are summarised
in table I.
From the equation above, we calculate that using the
camera in the Nokia cell phone, and an extractor with a
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FIG. 5. Measurement of the quantum and classical noise of
our ATIK (a) and Nokia (b) detectors. At the operating con-
ditions quantum noise strongly dominates.
compression factor of 4, for example with k = 500 and
l = 2000, it would take an impossible ∼ 10118 trials to
notice a deviation from a perfectly random bit string.
If everybody on earth used such a device constantly at
1Gbps, it would take 1080 times the age of the universe
for one to notice a deviation from a perfectly random bit
string.
RESULTS AND TESTS
We collected 48 frames corresponding to approxi-
mately 5 Gbits of raw random numbers and processed
them on a computer through an extractor with a 2000
bit input vector and a 500 bit output vector to generate
1.25 Gbits of random numbers. Random number gener-
ators are notoriously hard to test, however it is possible
to check the generated bit string for specific weaknesses.
The first step is to individuate potential problems of the
system, and then test for them. First, we tested the
generated random bit string before extraction. At this
stage, the entropy per bit is still considerably less than
unity; moreover, possible errors could arise from dead
pixels and from correlations between pixels values given
by electrical noise.
Besides increasing the mean entropy per bit, the ran-
domness extractor also ensures that if some of the pix-
els become damaged, covered by dust or suffer from any
other problem, an extremely good quality of the random-
ness is maintained.
Finally, we performed the “die harder” battery of ran-
domness tests on both the extracted bit strings. This
set of tests contains the NIST test, the diehard tests and
some extra tests. The RNG passed all tests.
Speed
For many applications, such as the generation of cryp-
tographic keys or gaming, speed is not as important
as the affordability and portability given by this sys-
tem. Nevertheless, a quantum random number generator
based on an image sensor can provide very reasonable
performance in terms of speed. Consumer grade devices
acquire data at rates between 100 Megapixels per second
and 1 Gigapixel per second. After the necessary process-
ing, each pixel will typically provide 3 random bits so that
rates between 300 Mbps and 3 Gbps can be obtained.
To sustain such high data rates, processing can be done
either on an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),
or could be embedded directly on a CMOS sensor chip.
Implementing the extractor fully in the software of a con-
sumer device can sustain random bit rates greater than 1
Mbps, largely sufficient for most consumer applications.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We demonstrate a generator of random numbers of
quantum origin using technology compatible with con-
sumer and portable electronics. We believe that the
simplicity and performance of this device will make the
widespread use of quantum random numbers a reality,
with an important impact on information security.
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